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Affective Reading: Chaucer, Women and Romance 
 
Introduction 
Mind and body, head and heart, thinking and feeling . . . dualisms of this kind, so 
familiar that they have become clichés, rely on the opposition of body and mind 
characteristic of Cartesian philosophy.  Dualism has long roots, stretching back to the 
neo-Platonic concepts of body and soul that were so influential for Christian 
philosophy.  But the body-mind opposition does not map neatly onto medieval 
thought, which emphasised the integration of thinking and feeling.  This integration is 
crucial to literary representation and interpretation of mind, body and emotion, and to 
the notion of reading as affective across literary cultures.  Of  all  medieval  English  
writers,  Chaucer  is  perhaps  most  deeply  engaged  with  the  power  of  affect  on  
both  minds  and  bodies.  He  returns  again  and  again  to  the  psychology  of  love  
and  loss:  in  the  Book  of  the  Duchess,  the  Knight’s  Tale,  Troilus  and  Criseyde,  
and  The  Legend  of  Good  Women.  Thinking  and  feeling  provide  a  crucial  focus  
in  these  works,  particularly  in  relation  to  female  subjects.  How might women  
readers  have  engaged  with  these  ideas?  Women  were  traditionally  assumed  to  
be  more  bodily,  more  emotional,  yet  as  we  shall  see,  Chaucer  emphasises  the  
relationship  between  thinking  and  feeling,  the  embodied  nature  of  being  in  the  
world,  across  his  works  and  across  genders.  The nexus of mind, body and affect  
resonates with the concerns of women’s literary culture, while women play crucial 
roles in Chaucer’s works as thinking and feeling subjects. 
 
Medieval  Thinking  and  Feeling 
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Hippocrates’ theory of the humours, developed by Galen in the second century and 
fundamental to medieval medical theory, necessitated the idea of a mind-body 
continuum.  Both physical and mental health were dependent on the balance of the 
four humours, as were individual temperament and complexion; each humour was 
also linked to the stars and planets, and the individual seen as responsive to the forces 
of the cosmos.
1
  Distinctions between mind and body, thinking and feeling, were 
complex and more fluid than in post-Cartesian thought.  They were complicated by 
notions of the soul, different views on where in the body faculties were situated, and 
different models of how thought and emotion worked.  Aristotle situated the rational 
or intellective quality within the soul, and located the heart as the centre of senses and 
cognitive faculties.  Galen, by contrast, associated these with the brain, though 
popular notions persisted well beyond the Middle Ages of the heart as site of 
understanding and feeling.  Neo-platonic theories situated the immortal and rational 
part of the soul in the head; the appetites and emotions (termed “passions” or 
“affections”, because they were suffered involuntarily) in the trunk of the body.  
Augustine placed the will as a faculty of the “superior part of the soul” and emotions 
as “movements of the lower parts”, but saw emotions as having both cognitive and 
bodily aspects, as both evaluative and affective.
2
   
By the end of the thirteenth century, a new interest in psychology, and 
particularly in how thinking worked, was developing.  Qualities once attributed to the 
rational soul were now situated in the brain, perhaps partly as a result of medical 
observation of the effects of head injuries.   Medical and philosophical views 
generally held that cognition was two-part: cognitive processes were mediated by the 
physiological mechanisms of the cerebral ventricles and by the rational soul/mind.  
Physiological theories were rooted in the concept developed in Arabic medicine of 
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three types of spirit: natural, vital and animal.
3
  The natural spirit was produced in the 
liver and sent through the veins: it enabled generation, nutrition and physical growth.  
The vital spirit originated in the heart and moved through the arteries to give life to 
the body.  In the brain, the vital spirit was transformed into the animal spirit, which 
controlled sensation and movement, but also imagination, cogitation and memory.  
The senses, each connected with its own organ, were understood to be put together by 
the inner senses, situated in the ventricles of the brain, the centre of both sensory and 
cognitive faculties.  Thoughts were dependent on “forms”, imagines, simulacra or 
phantasmata (Aristotle also uses eikón, copy), sense impressions involving perception 
and response, put together by the inner senses, and passing through imagination, 
cognition and memory.   Avicenna’s De anima, translated (into Latin) in the twelfth 
century, gives an account of the process, describing the five cells of the brain: at the 
front, the sensus communis (where information was processed, with impressions 
retained briefly) and imaginatio (a temporary memory retaining forms); in the middle 
imaginativa (“a creative power, able to separate or combine the forms that it retrieves 
from imaginatio, thus providing man with the mental power to imagine things, even 
things that do not exist”)4 and estimativa (the site of cognitive processes, where 
judgements were made, and which could draw on memory); and at the back 
memorialis (the storehouse of memory, where these “phantasms” or memory-pictures 
were kept, imprinted, literally marked on the body through the physiological process 
triggered by the senses).
5
  Phantasmata are the products of “the entire process of 
sense perception”: quasi-pictures or representations derived from sensory processes 
but with affective weight, “emotionally charged”.6  The imaginativa or phantasy had 
the dangerous ability to deceive reason, estimativa, as Albertus Magnus emphasised 
in his widely-circulated De apprehensione.
7
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The process of thinking was inextricable from the physiology of emotion.  
Emotions were understood to occur through the movements of the vital spirit and 
natural heat, produced in the heart and travelling through the arteries.  They could be 
triggered by direct sensory experience, but also by the workings of imagination and 
memory, including, of course, the affects of reading, and they had both physiological 
and mental consequences.  In excessive joy or anger, the vital spirit and 
accompanying heat moved out of the heart to other parts of the body, causing, for 
example, blushing for joy or shame.  In excessive grief, distress or fear, by contrast, 
the vital spirit and heat withdrew from the arteries into the heart, with the possibility 
of causing unconsciousness or even death.   
Thomas Aquinas developed sophisticated ideas of mind, body and affect that 
spanned the physiological and theological.  For Aquinas, the human is a compound of 
body and soul.  The emotions necessarily have a cognitive as well as an affective 
aspect: they are felt in the body through the movement of the spirits, but require the 
process of phantasmata, sensory images put together in the brain; they influence and 
are affected by cognition.
 
 The imagination plays a
 
crucial role in understanding.
8
  
Soul, mind, intellect, thought, emotion, affect, senses, and body were all intimately 
connected; emotions both shaped the understanding and were visibly written on the 
body.  Merleau-Ponty’s theories of embodiment chime closely with such ideas, and 
so, perhaps surprisingly, do the recent theories of cognitive neuroscientists, in 
particular, Antonio Damasio, who has argued that emotion is essential to cognition 
and moral judgement; that rather than being in opposition, mind, body and affect are 
closely and inextricably linked.
9
  
 
Medieval Reading and the Emotions 
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It is easy to understand the process of reading in terms of this view of thinking 
and feeling.  Reading drew first on the sense impressions created by the text: most 
obviously, through visual impressions of the letters, words and mise en page, but also 
through sound impressions of the words, and touch impressions of the book as a 
physical object.  The imagined world of the book brought its own array of sense 
impressions: visual images and concepts, aural aspects, evocations of touch, taste and 
smell, and readers were encouraged imaginatively to vivify these.  Within the sensus 
communis, the impressions taken in through the physical act of reading were 
processed, finding their way into the middle cell of the brain to be creatively 
assembled in the imagination and to be considered by the estimative powers.  They 
contributed to but also drew on the storehouse of the memory: reading presented 
“memorial cues” that functioned as a “foundation”, filled in through the images stored 
within the memory, in all their sensory aspects.
10
  Reading required both cognitive 
and affective processes.  The contemplative reader was to progress through the “foure 
ronges” of reading, as they are called in a Middle English translation of the 
Carthusian Scala claustralium: “a besy lokyng vpon Holy Writte”, “A studious 
inserchyng with the mynde”, “a devoute desiryng of the hert”, and “a risyng of hert 
into God”.11 
The nexus of mind, body and affect is especially evident in affective piety and 
in theories of devotional reading, particularly relating to women’s literary culture, but 
it is crucial too for secular writing, and to any analysis of reading imaginative fiction.  
For Chaucer, this interrelation is both subject and mode: the workings of mind, body 
and affect are key to psychological representation but also define the reader’s relation 
to the text.  In the Book of the Duchess, he engages directly with the relationship 
between reading, thinking and feeling, and probes the affective power of the 
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imagination.  In both the Knight’s Tale and Troilus and Criseyde, he explores the 
connection between body and mind, the cognitive aspects of emotion and the shaping 
power of affect.   For his female protagonists in the Legend of Good Women, and for 
its readers, the interconnection of cognition and affect is crucial to agency.
12
 
What was the social relation of women readers to these works?  Women were 
patrons, owners, occasional writers and most of all readers of books.
13
  Much 
scholarship exploring women’s reading has focused on devotional literature, in 
particular, the close and productive connection between women and affective piety.
14
  
But it is clear that, despite the predominance of the spiritual in medieval culture, there 
was also a connection between women and secular writing in medieval England and 
on the Continent.
15
  Carol Meale observes that romances, particularly French 
Arthurian romance, “form the second largest generic grouping amongst women’s 
books in the Middle Ages as a whole”.16  Meale offers instances of fourteenth- and 
fifteenth-century women known to have owned the romances of Lancelot and Tristan; 
Chaucer’s Nun’s Priest’s Tale gestures more ironically to the phenomenon, in his 
reference to “the book of Launcelot de Lake, / That wommen holde in ful greet 
reverence” (VII 3212-13).  Internal evidence implies that romances were read aloud in 
courtly circles and aristocratic households to mixed audiences, as well as by 
individual male and female readers.  The depiction in Chaucer’s Troilus of Criseyde 
and her women listening to a maiden read the tale of the siege of Thebes offers a 
tantalising image of a group of female readers.
17
   
D. H. Green’s suggestive analysis of ways of reading distinguishes different 
kinds of “literal reading”: reading to the self or others, aloud or silently, reading in 
different languages, reading as a writer.  He distinguishes too different kinds of 
“figurative reading”: mental reading, “with the mind’s eye in the absence of any 
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material written text”, reading pictures, memorised reading.18  Reading provides ways 
of interpreting the world outside the text, as well as opening onto imaginative worlds.  
As Melissa Furrow emphasises, it is impossible to define a characteristic female 
reading of romance, for the stances of women readers, like those of men, are likely to 
have been as various as those of the works they read.   Yet we can probe further the 
representation of mind, body and affect, the workings of the imagination and the 
complex interrelation of thinking and feeling, including in female protagonists.  While 
we cannot access the lived experience of medieval readers, such insights may bring us 
closer to an understanding of the affective reading of romance by women. 
 
Sorrowful Imagination: The Book  of the Duchess 
Throughout Chaucer’s romance writings, his interest in mind, body and affect 
is apparent, and it is often this that takes his representations beyond convention.    The 
Book of the Duchess is especially revealing, for here Chaucer explores the physiology 
of reading, alongside that of grief and love.  The narrator’s processes of thought are 
carefully depicted: “sorwful ymagynacioun / Ys alway hooly in [his] mynde” (14-15).  
Imagines held in his memory are repeatedly revisited, creating “fantasies” in his head 
and causing a melancholy which has “sleyn [his] spirit of quyknesse” (26) and 
numbed his feeling.  His taking up of a book, a “romaunce” (48), is a conscious 
response to the sleeplessness that accompanies the sorrow we assume to be love-
sickness.  The affective power of reading will lead the narrator through the processes 
of grief, memory and mourning, and ultimately, the memorialisation of writing itself. 
The “wonder thing” (61) the narrator reads, the story of Ceyx and Alcyone, 
sustains the theme of melancholy that “sley[s] spirit of quyknesse” (26).  Chaucer’s 
pared-down version of Ovid’s tale focuses on Alcyone’s grief at Ceyx’s drowning and 
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her existential lament, “Alas! . . . that I was wrought!” (90).  Her sorrow leads to a 
swoon in which she is “cold as ston” (123), a conventional detail, but one that refers 
precisely to the withdrawal of vital spirits into the heart through extreme emotion.   
Her swoon presages the sight of Ceyx’s drowned corpse, “pale and nothyng rody” 
(143), and is echoed in her “dede slep” (127) and the “dedly slepynge soun” (162) that 
marks Morpheus’ cave.  Images of the insensible body abound.   Yet the narrative 
hovers strangely between the tragic and the prosaic, so that the reader is made 
uneasily aware of the tension between the profound and absurd in human existence.  
The tale ends suddenly: “‘Allas!’ quod she for sorwe, / And deyede within the thridde 
morwe” (213-14).  There is no metamorphosis, and the emphasis of the story becomes 
the finality of death.  In a typically jarring shift of tone, however, the insight gleaned 
by the narrator is that of the power the gods to make men sleep or wake, and hence 
the tale leads into the comic scene of his prayer to Morpheus.  Extremes of emotion 
are offset by affective failures of sensibility.   
This balance also characterises the narrator’s dream.  In his depiction of the 
Man in Black Chaucer explores the complex connections between mind, body and 
affect that characterise extreme grief, while the narrator’s response reiterates the 
affective failure of understanding.  The Dreamer stands in for the reader, feeling and 
seeing the affective power of a grief that is written on the body as the spirits 
withdraw:  
 
Hys sorwful hert gan faste faynte 
And his spirites wexen dede; 
The blood was fled for pure drede 
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Doun to hys herte, to make hym warm -  
For wel hyt feled the herte had harm. . . .  (488-92) 
The flight of blood into the “membre principal” (495) of the body causes “al / Hys 
hewe chaunge and wexe grene / And pale, for ther noo blood ys sene / In no maner 
lym of hys” (497-99).  Chaucer draws on Machaut’s Jugement dou Roy de Behaingne, 
but points up and develops the physiology of grief to depict an affective state that is 
near death.   At the same time, the Man in Black’s consciousness of the power of 
affect is striking; he is a reader of his own predicament:  
 
. . . he spak noght , 
But argued with his owne thoght,  
And in hys wyt disputed faste 
Why and how hys lyf myght laste; 
Hym thoughte hys sorwes were so smerte 
And lay so colde upon hys herte.  (504-8) 
He could not be more shaped by his passions: “y am sorwe, and sorwe ys y” (597).  
Yet cognition plays a striking role in his identity: alongside the bodily manifestation 
of affect in his heart-sickness, his thought, disputation and wit are all triggered by his 
grief.  The narrator suggests he had “wel nygh loste hys mynde” (511), but rather, he 
is lost in his mind, in his “sorwful ymagynacioun” (“whan al this falleth in my thoght, 
/ Allas, than am I overcome!”, 706-7), which will recreate through the images stored 
in memory a picture of his lost duchess.   
Love is presented explicitly as working on the mind (“love cam first in my 
thoght”, 789), and the heart is presented as both the seat of feeling and thought (“she 
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syt so in myn herte / That, by my trouthe, y nolde noght / For al thys world out of my 
thoght / Leve my lady”, 1109-11).  The reconstruction of Blanche paints her as the 
ideal lady, embodying all courtly virtues, but also becomes an inset narrative that 
depicts not just her beauty, but her embodied self, her “lokyng” (870), movement, 
voice, touch, and the entire process of their love.  The tale of love and loss is re-
enacted through the imagines summoned up from the memory of the Man in Black, in 
turn stored in the narrator’s memory, and eventually written down, to enter the 
memories of the poem’s readers.  The memory will function like the Dreamer’s 
chamber with its stained glass window and walls on which “bothe text and glose” of 
the Romance of the Rose, evoked in words and images, are painted (333).  But the 
difficulty of interpreting imagines is also conveyed, through the Dreamer’s repeated 
failures to comprehend the meaning of the Man in Black’s words, and especially, to 
realise that the seemingly conventional love lyric, “a lay, a maner song, / Withoute 
noote, withoute song” (471-72), is a statement of actual death.   
In part, the Man in Black’s lament mirrors Alcyone’s, while he is led through 
the Dreamer’s questions to a new, direct expression, “She ys ded!” (1309), that recalls 
the abrupt account of Alcyone’s death.  This affective, gender-crossing impact works 
directly on the dreamer to convey the jarring, devastating and universal fact of death, 
but also, through processes of empathy, questioning and understanding, to inspire the 
written text.  The poem evokes the uneven, sudden, haunting quality of affect, 
inscribing it on the reader’s memory via a series of “texts” – literary and imaginative 
memorials.  Through the inset story of Alcyone’s grief and death, which mirrors the 
emotions of the grieving narrator and the Man in Black, and by reanimating the lost 
beloved, Blanche, the poem both draws in the female reader through its affective 
power and transcends questions of gender.   
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The Physiology of Love: The Knight’s Tale 
In The Knight’s Tale, Chaucer explores further the nature of affective 
response, and the workings of the mind, senses and memory.  The tale is rooted in the 
conventions of love-sickness, and relies on the neo-Platonic convention of love 
striking through the eyes to wound the heart.  But Chaucer repeatedly goes beyond 
familiar metaphor to demonstrate a detailed awareness of contemporary physiological 
theory in his depiction of the deathly affects of love on Palamon and Arcite.  
Palamon’s jealousy, for example, “hente him by the herte / So woodly that he lyk was 
to biholde / The boxtree or the asshen dede and cold” (I 1300-2): the vital spirit is 
driven into his heart to cause coldness.  Jacqueline Tasioulas argues persuasively that 
Chaucer differentiates the lovers, using the more conventional, though graphically 
realised, notion of love-sickness in relation to Palamon but situating Arcite’s malady 
as an illness of the brain: 
 
. . . lene he wex and drye as is a shaft;  
His eyen holwe and grisly to biholde,  
His hewe falow and pal as asshen colde . . . 
So feble eek were his spiritz, and so lowe,  
And chaunged so, that no man koude knowe 
His speche nor his voys, though men it herde. 
And in his geere for al the world he ferde 
Nat oonly lik the loveris maladye 
Of Hereos, but rather lyk manye, 
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Engendered of humour malencolik 
Biforen, in his celle fantastik.  (I 1362-76)
19
 
Chaucer draws on medical ideas about the influence of affect on the brain, available 
to him, for instance, through Bartholomaeus Anglicus’ De rerum proprietatibus, 
translated by John of Trevisa.
20
  Trevisa describes how the passions of the soul 
engender the melancholy humour, which works on the “celle fantastik”, the front 
ventricle of the brain controlling the imagination.  In a state of melancholy, the 
subject loses the ability to judge and reason; in a state of mania, as here, the 
imagination cannot perceive new images but sees only the beloved.  Gerard de Berry 
in the thirteenth century described how the estimatio might become overactive, 
repeatedly demanding from the senses images of the beloved, with the effect that the 
imagination and the eyes lose heat.
21
  Whereas the Man in Black’s vital spirit 
withdraws into the heart, here heat is drawn into the brain, causing pallour and hollow 
eyes.  The overload of images creates a kind of frenzy, as Arcite’s inner senses return 
obsessively to the image of his beloved, bodying it forth again and again in his mind’s 
eye.   
Most striking is Arcite’s own awareness of the workings of affect on his body 
and mind.  He takes up a mirror: 
 
And saugh that chaunged was al his colour,  
And saugh his visage al in another kynde.  
And ryght anon it ran hym in his mynde, 
That, sith his face was so disfigured  
Of maladye the which he hadde endured, 
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He myghte wel, if that he bar hym lowe, 
Lyve in Atthenes everemooore unknowe. . . .  (I 1400-6) 
 
As with the Man in Black, affect manifests itself in extreme physical illness, but it 
also colours and shapes Arcite’s cognitive processes: the image of himself stimulates 
his plan of disguise.  Arcite’s injury at the end of the tale, sapping the “vital 
strengthe” (I 2802) of his heart, graphically sustains Chaucer’s engagement with 
medical detail.  Readers are shown the workings of the mind, the arbitrary, extreme 
power of affect and its dominance over the body.  One of the effects of viewing this 
extreme love, with its dramatic and tragic outcomes, may be to distance readers from 
the narrative even while it so vividly realises the physiology of love.   
 Perhaps this distance is – and was – enhanced for female readers by the 
detachment of Emilye, a trophy of war who begins and ends the tale as an object to be 
fought over and won by men, for years unaware of her lovers’ emotional anguish and 
enmity.  Her first appearance is described with an ekphrasis very like that used to 
evoke Blanche, but though we see Emilye in the present, we hear less of her voice: 
only her “hevenysshly” singing ( I 1055) is recounted, and later, her tears.  Unlike 
Blanche, Emilye never becomes a free agent in her own romance.  Her voice is heard 
only once in her haunting prayer to Diana, which for a brief moment opens a window 
onto the predicament of the woman objectified within the male structures of battle and 
love.  The images in the temple are not of love’s delights but of attempted rape, of the 
classical nymph Callisto, metamorphosed as she flees the rape of Jupiter, and of Pluto, 
who has abducted Proserpina to the Underworld whence she cannot escape; they are 
accompanied by a reference to a woman wailing in childbirth, an ominous hint of the 
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future that Emilye fears.  The “freendlich ye” (I 2680) she casts on Arcite hints at the 
start of an affective connection, appropriately effected through the gaze, and reiterated 
in the shrieks she utters at Arcite’s death.  But the intervention of the gods also returns 
Emilye to the status of object: though we are told of her pity and love for Palamon, we 
never again hear her voice.  The affective visual and aural power of the images in 
Diana’s temple, and the lamenting figure of Emilye herself, work on the reader’s 
imagination and memory, to create a strong empathy for the silenced object of the 
lover’s sickness and frenzy, and more generally, for the predicament of women in a 
patriarchal world. 
 
Mirrors of the Mind: Troilus and Criseyde 
Troilus and Criseyde takes further the exploration of mind, body and affect.  It 
too relies on the neo-Platonic convention of the connection between eyes and heart: 
on first seeing Criseyde, Troilus’ heart is caused to “sprede and rise” as if on fire, 
wounding and quickening his “affeccioun” (I, 278, 296).  Sensual perception acts on 
the vital spirit to occasion emotion – felt at once in body and mind.  Chaucer uses 
ancient notions of heart as seat of both thought and feeling (Criseyde’s image is fixed 
in Troilus’ heart), but at the same time, plays on the cognitive aspects of emotion.  
Affect shapes the workings of the brain, producing phantasmata or thought-images: 
Troilus’ thought “gan quiken and encresse”; and he makes “a mirour of his mynde” in 
which he sees “al holly hire figure” (I, 443, 365-66).   
Throughout the process of Troilus’ love, his affective experience is extreme: 
he feels that “with hire look [will die] the spirit in his herte” (I, 306), and again and 
again, the heart’s illness pervades the body.  The imagery is conventional but also 
medically alert.  Seeing Criseyde weep, Troilus feels “the crampe of deth to streyne 
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hym by the herte” (III, 1071), and faints.  The physiology of the swoon is carefully 
detailed: 
 
Therewith the sorwe so his herte shette 
That from his eyen fil there nought a tere,  
And every spirit his vigour in knette, 
So they astoned or oppressed were; 
The felyng of his sorwe, or of his fere, 
Or of aught elles, fled was out of towne –   
And down he fel al sodeynly a-swowne.  (III, 1086-92) 
While here the sudden, complete withdrawal of the vital spirit causes unconsciouness, 
Troilus’ response to hearing of the exchange of Criseyde for Antenor exhibits the 
affect of angry grief, “woodnesse” (IV, 238), a term that, though the description of his 
physical frenzy is taken from Boccaccio, is Chaucer’s own.  Eventually, the “fury” 
and “rage” that grip Troilus’ heart give way to grief and the withdrawal of vital spirit, 
so that he falls “in a traunce” (IV, 343).  As Troilus waits for Criseyde to fulfil her 
promise and return in ten days’ time, his “maladie” is such that he believes he cannot 
live (V, 297, 316).  His slumber is broken by terrible nightmares and a “tremour. . . 
aboute his herte” (V, 255).  When Criseyde fails to return and her betrayal becomes 
gradually, excruciatingly apparent, that imagining becomes true.  Troilus is literally 
unmade by love:   
 
He so defet was, that no manere man                                    
Unneth hym myghte knowen ther he wente;                         
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So was he lene, and therto pale and wan, 
And feble, that he walketh by potente.  (V, 1219-22) 
He complains of grievous pain around his heart.  While again the symptoms of 
Troilus’ grief are drawn from Boccaccio, Chaucer’s addition of the crutch strikingly 
heightens its physicality.  Only at the sight of Criseyde’s brooch on Diomede’s sleeve 
does active fury (“ire”, V, 1755) replace melancholy. 
Yet Chaucer also continues to emphasise the cognitive aspects of love and 
grief.  In bliss, Troilus becomes the “lyric artist”, the narrative interspersed with his 
songs.  Love opens onto a vision of cosmic harmony and inspires moral excellence.  
Later, Troilus’ “herte thoughte” is so constantly on Criseyde, “so faste ymagenynge” 
(V, 453-54) that he cannot be distracted by feasting and revelry.  Imagining is, 
literally, image-making: Troilus, re-reading Criseyde’s letters, “refigures” “hire shap, 
hire wommanhede, / Withinne his herte” (V, 473-74).  He has the “proces”, the course 
of events, “lik a storie” in his memory (V, 583-85), and Chaucer’s evocation of the 
awakening of that process is masterful.  As Troilus looks at the closed windows of 
Criseyde’s palace and visits the places where he saw her, he thinks his heart “as frost. 
. . gan to colde” and we see his “chaunged dedlich pale face” (V, 535-56). He 
imagines, sees in his mind’s eye, himself as “defet, and pale, and waxen lesse / Than 
he was wont” (V, 618-19) and as the subject of onlookers who fear he will die.  And, 
like the man in black, Troilus’ grief also leads him to philosophy, to “argue with his 
owne thought” and dispute in his wits.   
Cognition and affect combine in Chaucer’s portrayal of Criseyde, in ways that 
allow him strikingly to rework her character.  Yet he also leaves us finally uncertain 
regarding Criseyde’s motivation, and psychological insight becomes highly selective.  
As with Troilus, Chaucer is concerned to depict her love in terms of animated 
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emotion.  Her response on seeing Troilus ride by is one of instinctive desire, described 
through the convention of the imprint of the eyes on the heart, and the Petrarchean 
image of love as drink (II, 650-51).  This experience is swiftly followed, however, by 
her extended monologue, striking for its highly rational and pragmatic approach 
setting out the case for and against love, and its difference from the voice of Troilus 
lamenting the wound of irresistible love.  Yet the monologue is characterised by 
uncertainty, opposing one point of view by another, and the image of clouds rushing 
across an uncertain March sky suggests Criseyde’s changeable mind.  The images of 
death that accompany Troilus’ experience of love also occur in relation to Criseyde, 
but convey the affect occasioned by fear of the consequences of love, “Criseyde, 
which that wel neigh starf for feere, / So as she was the ferfulleste wight / That 
myghte be” (II, 449-51).  Whereas Troilus looks out to the cosmic harmony of love, 
Criseyde looks fearfully inward, caught within her imaginings of differently 
constraining situations.    
Once Fortune’s wheel has turned and Criseyde has been offered in exchange 
for Antenor, Chaucer portrays Criseyde’s extreme grief as written on her body: her 
face, once “lik of Paradys the ymage,” is now “al ychaunged in another kynde” (IV, 
864-65), her laughter replaced by the tears that leave a purple ring around her eyes.  
Her predicament in the Greek camp is enhanced by Chaucer’s emphasis on physical 
affect: her “brighte face” is “ful pale ywoxen”, her “lymes lene”; she sighs and weeps, 
“And thus she sette hire woful herte afire / Thorugh remembraunce of that she gan 
desire” (V, 708-9, 719-20).  But the poem begins to move away from insight into 
Criseyde’s psyche: on the tenth day, she is characterised by “peynes stronge / For love 
of Troilus” (V, 864-65), yet remains there, caught by Diomede.  The last of her voice 
is heard at a remove, in the enigmatic letter she sends to Troilus, its prevarications set 
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against its poignant opening: “How myght a wight in torment and in drede / And 
heleles, yow sende as yet gladnesse?” (V, 1592-93).  Apart from the veiled, 
ambiguous words of her letters, however, Criseyde has faded out of the story.   
The affective role of the reader is pointed up in this self-consciously literary 
work that is so engaged with the question of authority and interpretation, in which 
Criseyde herself voices the future of her story, and we read the inset laments and 
letters of the lovers, and the lyrics of Troilus.  For the reader attuned to thinking and 
feeling, Criseyde’s laments are suggestive in their evocation of the workings of the 
mind.  Loss in love opens onto her expression of profound regret and statement of the 
transience of all things: “al shal passe; and thus take I my leve” (V, 1085).  Earlier, as 
she looks out over Troy’s walls and towers, she raises the philosophical question of 
the situation of the individual within time: “On tyme ypassed wel remembred me, / 
And present tyme ek koud ich wel ise, / But future tyme, er I was in the snare, / 
Koude I nat sen; that causeth now my care” (V, 746-49).  This sense of being caught 
in the present, defined by memory, yet unable correctly to foresee the future, is crucial 
to Chaucer’s portrayal of Criseyde.  In the mind’s eye, with the imagines stored in 
memory, she has pictured different kinds of future – with and without Troilus, with a 
return to Troy, even with her death – that she believes she will be able to enact.  In the 
event, however, she has not been free to make real her mental images, and is left only 
with the affect of grief.  Criseyde’s lament points up the gap between imagination and 
reality, between memory, made up of past experience, and the future.  This, after all is 
the existential predicament of all humankind: how can hope become reality?  For the 
female reader, aware of cultural and social constraints on agency, such a predicament 
is rendered peculiarly haunting. 
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Passion and Reason: The Legend of Good Women 
Late in his career, Chaucer returned to the dream vision form, rewriting the 
themes of female love and grief through the lens of legend.  The Legend of Good 
Women draws on the nexus of virtue, suffering and death familiar from lives of the 
female saints, but its women are very different from, for example, Cecilia in the 
Second Nun’s Tale, the archetype of active holy living and martyrdom.  Their agency 
is less certain; their physical actions more qualified.  Their actions respond to secular 
rather than divine love, they are victims of male betrayal, and several of their deaths 
are at their own hands.  By foregrounding the relation of his good women to Christian 
saints, as well as employing a notoriously ambiguous tone, Chaucer points up the 
paradoxes for the reader.  Even more than Troilus and Criseyde, this work draws 
attention to itself as literary artefact, the Prologue articulating the impossibility of 
retrieving the “naked text” it promises (G, 86), and setting up a complex fiction of 
Chaucer writing against himself.  Yet it seems reductive to read the Legend as 
predominantly ironic, or as imprisoning women within passive, suffering 
stereotypes.
22
  These women are given agency, and that agency is precisely conveyed 
through the careful realisation of mind, body and affect.  Their actions repeatedly 
signal the link between emotion and cognition, thinking and feeling; they are both 
passionate and reasoned.  By contrast, the villains of the Legend are depicted in terms 
of falseness and dissembling: actions do not truly reflect thoughts and feelings.  
Whereas the suicides of Antony and Piramus are presented as acts of despair, those of 
the women in the Legend involve intellect and free will: emotional responses are not 
opposed by but informed by cognitive and moral judgements.  Repeatedly, Chaucer 
conveys this process of affective and intellectual understanding by using the ancient 
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Aristotelian notion of the heart as seat of the emotions and of thought, but combines 
this with more contemporary ideas of the mind. 
Thinking and feeling are clearly integrated in Cleopatra, Chaucer’s first 
example: “drede” and “destresse” are informed by “trouthe” and “routhe” (664, 668-
69).  Her death is an active choice, made in obedience to her “sorweful herte”: suicide 
will ensure that Antony is “nere out of myn hertes remembraunce” and it fulfils her 
covenant, to feel the same “wel or wo” (681-89).  Its manner is extraordinarily active: 
this Cleopatra does not apply an asp to her arm but leaps into the snake-pit that she 
has prepared.  In the second legend, Thisbe’s suicide too is presented in terms of 
covenant: she is “felawe and cause ek of [Piramus’] deth”, and her death proves 
“strengthe and hardynesse”, that “a woman dar and can as wel” as a man (895, 892, 
923).  Chaucer elaborates the bodily characteristics of the sorrow that physically 
seizes Thisbe: “wawes quappe gan hir herte” (865).  In her pallor, rent hair, swoon, 
tears, torment and painting of herself with Piramus’ blood, she is a living emblem of 
grief.  The affective force of the “drery herte”, however, fuels the decisive physical 
action of suicide: “My woful hand . . . is strong ynogh” (810, 890).  Strikingly, Thisbe 
looks for Piramus “bothe with hire herte and with hire yen” (859) – with feeling and 
with senses connected to the brain – and her words make clear the rational as well as 
emotive force of her action.     
In the Legend of Dido, love is as physical as grief: Dido “lost hire hewe and 
ek hire hele” (1159); the symptoms are described in some detail.  “Depe affeccioun” 
(1229) is envisaged as seated in the heart.  But Chaucer is also explicit about the 
nature of love as involving remembrance and cogitation: “This newe Troyan is so in 
my thought” (1172).   Aeneas’ experience seems similar, “moche sorwe hadde he in 
his mynde” (946), but here body, heart and mind are not truly aligned: his woe is 
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“feyned” (1257), the dream summoning him on to his quest presented as an invention.   
Dido falls and swoons, a conventional image but also one that reflects medical notions 
of how extreme emotion – fear or grief – sends the vital spirit back from the arteries 
into the heart, and causes unconsciousness.  The same image is used in relation to 
Ariadne:  “Colde wex hire herte” (2197).  Heat, by contrast, a “fyry herte” (2292), 
accompanies savage actions such as Tereus’.  These extreme physical affects of the 
cold and hot heart are not used, however, to narrate consciously chosen deaths.  
Though we hear only briefly of Phyllis’ death, and it is related to despair, the terms 
are still striking: “She was hire owene deth ryght with a corde” (2485).  Her “trouthe” 
is set against the treachery of “false Demophon” (2398), and it is to the breaking of 
the mind-body-affect continuum that her lament draws attention: “How coude ye 
wepe so by craft?”; “May there swiche teres feyned be?” (2529-30).  Dido’s suicide is 
carefully reasoned: “whan she myghte hir tyme wel espie” she steals out with Aeneas 
sword, and “rof hyre to the herte”; she allows time for prayer, and her lament is stated 
consciously, “Right so to yow make I my compleynynge”(1349-51, 1357).  This 
active, thought-through death, like Cleopatra’s, stands in opposition to that of 
Hypsipyle, who in response to a similar betrayal of the alignment between mind, body 
and affect by the feigning Jason “deyede for his love, of sorwes smerte” (1579).   
Lucrece offers perhaps the most extreme and problematic instance of female 
agency.  The question of whether suicide in the context of rape was justified was hotly 
debated.  Though some theologians and writers were sympathetic, Augustine’s 
condemnation – the reverse of the “gret compassioun” (1690) with which he is 
credited by Chaucer – also exercised a powerful influence.23   Chaucer’s emphasis on 
the affective power of fear and shame lends credence to the hagiographic structures he 
uses, allowing his Lucrece to become an icon of “trouthe” (1860), loyalty, and 
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“stedefastnesse” (1687).  This “stedefastnesse” is physically manifest in Lucrece’s 
stillness, which is contrasted with Tarquinius’ irrational desire, depicted through 
images of fire and madness.  The rape scene exploits the physiology of fear; the 
physical affect of shock on the instinctive power of judgement shared by animals and 
humans: “Hire wit is al ago. / Ryght as a wolf that fynt a lomb alone, / To whom shal 
she compleyne or make mone?” (1797-99).  Lucrece’s fear of shame not only explains 
her submission to the rape, but also precludes any question of guilt by causing her to 
swoon: 
 
  . . . what for fer of sclaunder and drede of deth, 
  She loste bothe at ones wit and breth, 
  And in a swogh she lay, and wex so ded  
  Men myghte smyten of hire arm or hed; 
  She feleth no thyng, neyther foul ne fayr.  (1814-18) 
  
Lucrece’s unconsciousness has been seen as a defeat, in that it renders her still more 
one of the Legend’s “enervated, passive heroines,” unable even to control her body.24  
Yet this does not take account of the medieval medical understanding of the vital 
spirit as departing to the heart, leaving the body senseless in response to “fer” and 
“drede”.  The phrase “wit and breth” makes clear that the swoon is precisely related to 
the constraint of vital spirit, since this is regulated by breathing; in the brain deprived 
of spirit, the wits fail.  Inaction is the result of extreme affective response: it proves 
“trouthe” and contrasts starkly with Tarquinius’ treachery, where the uncontrolled 
vital spirit (ungoverned by the animal spirit that controls rationality) rushes out 
overheated from his fiery heart “so wodly” (1752), to cause the rash deed of rape.   
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The certainty of Lucrece’s innocence allows Chaucer to link her suicide with 
her shame, her concern for her husband’s name, and her refusal to be “forgiven” for a 
crime that she has not committed – all sentiments shaped by the values of Roman 
society.  But if Chaucer excuses Lucrece’s suicide by placing it historically, he also 
draws overtly on the genre of the saint’s life, to characterise it as voluntary 
martyrdom.  Even more than Dido’s, this is a reasoned action, performed despite the 
many “ensamples” Lucrece is offered: “Be as be may . . . of forgyvyng, / I wol not 
have noo forgyft for nothing” (1852-53).  Like Dido, she plans secretly, taking out the 
knife “pryvely”, and Chaucer uses strikingly active language, “she rafte hirself hir 
lyf” (1854-55).  This is an act of intent, freely chosen, courageously and carefully 
executed to preserve modesty by arranging her clothes as she falls, “So wel she loved 
clennesse and eke trouthe” (1860).  The narrator’s final emphasis is on firmness of 
will: “Ne in hir wille she chaunged for no newe”; she manifests “the stable herte, 
sadde and kynde” (1875-76).  Will is combined with affect and intellect in the idea of 
the firm, sober and natural heart.  Yet, ironically, for the raped body to sustain this, 
mind must also be set against body, the body-mind continuum broken, a breaking that 
is violently enacted in suicide.  This is the paradox of martyrdom: the bold body also 
becomes the dead body, the temporal movement of affect and will frozen in an 
eternally symbolic form. 
 
Conclusion 
Across Chaucer’s romance writings, mind, body and affect are inscribed in 
complex ways that link thinking, feeling, imagining and remembering: the acts 
intrinsic to the process of reading.  In Chaucer’s male protagonists, cognition and 
affect work powerfully upon body and mind, and are probed with striking 
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physiological vividness.  Readers see too a progression of portrayals of female mind, 
body and affect: from Blanche, her sensory being conjured up from memory, to 
Emilye, present, pitying yet largely silenced, to Criseyde, caught within the conflict of 
reason and desire, memory and possibility, to the women of the Legend, in whom the 
meeting of thinking and feeling create the agency of death.  Pathos and empathy act 
forcefully on the minds of readers to animate their stories and their laments.  
Paradoxically, love and loss, betrayal and death also become affirmative in their 
affective power.  In the exploration of affect and cognition, of truly felt emotion and 
active choices governing minds and bodies, these narratives evoke grief and empathy, 
but for their readers they also speak to the possibility and the power of female agency. 
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